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he purpose of the proposed banking union 
is to de-link banks from their sovereigns. 
The  ‘Single  Supervisory  Mechanism’ 
(SSM)  should  correct  the  tendency  of 
national  supervisors  to  overlook  problems  at 
home.  Although  the  European  Central  Bank 
(ECB)  will  directly  supervise  only  a  limited 
number  of  large  banks,  it  will  also  exercise  a 
‘droit  de  regard’  over  the  rest  of  the  banking 
system.  This should  make  it  much more  likely 
that  bubbles  and  other  threats  to  the  systemic 
stability  of  the  banking  system  will  be 
recognised  earlier.  It  is  also  widely  recognised 
that the SSM requires an SRM (‘Single Resolution 
Mechanism’), the details of which are still being 
worked  out.  But  it  should  contain  a  common 
resolution  fund  that  would  ensure  that  any 
problems that might still arise could no longer 
threaten  the  solvency  of  the  national 
government, as happened in Spain and Ireland 
and more recently in an extreme form in Cyprus.  
Establishing  the  SSM  and  the  SRM  is  certainly 
useful  to  sever  the  doomed  loop  between  the 
sovereign and the banks. But this is not enough. 
Any  country  that  experiences  a  large-scale 
banking  crisis  will  also  have  a  very  weak 
economy.  This  implies  that  government 
revenues  will  fall  and  expenditure  on 
unemployment  compensation  will  increase. 
Large  public  deficits  are  the  consequence  of 
nearly  all  banking  crises.  This  means  that  the 
finances of a government with a banking crisis 
will come under pressure even if a large part of 
the direct costs of the banking crisis is borne at 
the  Union  level  through  the  mechanisms  of  a 
banking union. Under these circumstances, it is 
likely  that  the  risk  premia  on  public  debt  also 
increase and that there will be natural pressure 
on the banks in the country to become the buyers 
of last resort of the national public debt. The ECB 
might  not  have  any  effective  instrument  to 
prevent this from happening, and it will at any 
rate not be the supervisor for the many smaller 
banks that might assume this role on a massive 
scale. But once the local banks have accumulated 
large amounts of the national debt, the fate of the 
sovereign  and  the  banks  become  again  linked 
leading  to  the  disruptive  self-reinforcing 
feedback loops that brought the euro area to the 
brink of collapse in 2011-12. 
The  objective  of  de-linking  banks  from  their 
sovereign  will  thus  not  be  achieved  if  banks 
continue to hold massive amounts of the debt of 
their  own  country.  De-linking  banks  from  the 
sovereign (or rather their own sovereign) should 
be in the interest of all policy-makers because it 
would  make  the  financial  system  more  stable. 
However, it should be particularly in the interest 
T 2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
of  the  creditor  countries  because  market 
discipline can be effective only if the system is 
stable.  The  rescue  operations  for  Greece  (and 
other countries) were motivated by the fact that 
the  prospect  of  a  sovereign  default  had 
destabilised the entire euro area banking system. 
This  would  not  have  been  the  case  if  banks 
throughout the euro area did not hold massive 
amounts  of  sovereign  debt  on  their  balance 
sheets. 
This  contribution  will  discuss  a  number  of 
regulatory  incentives  for  banks  to  hold 
government  bonds  –  the  most  important  of 
which  is  specific  to  the  euro  area.  These 
incentives  apply  to  banks  in  all  countries,  but 
most  of  the  time  the  rate  of  interest  on 
government  assets  is  lower  than  that  on  other 
assets,  and  often  lower  than  the  cost  of 
refinancing  for  the  banks  themselves,  thus 
diminishing  the  interest  of  banks  to  hold 
government  bonds.  However,  during  the  euro 
crisis, the return on some government bonds was 
much higher than the refinancing cost for banks.  
This provided a very strong additional incentive 
for  banks  in  some  countries  to  increase  their 
sovereign exposure (Archayan & Steffen, 2012). 
It is thus not surprising that in many eurozone 
countries domestic banks often hold more than 
20% of domestic public debt – much more than 
in the US, where banks do not hold significant 
amounts  of  government  bonds.  This  relative 
concentration  of  public  debt  on  bank  balance 
sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, as can 
be  seen  from  Figure  1,  which  shows  that  in 
France and Italy domestic banks always held a 
considerable  fraction  of  total  public  debt.  The 
data  for  Germany  are  surprising  as  they show 
that in the not-so-distant past more than one-half 
of the country’s total national debt was held by 
German banks. This might be partially due to the 
fact  that  a  large  part  of  public  debt  originates 
with  the  Länder  and  communes,  which  in 
general  do  not  issue  bonds,  but  obtain  loans 
directly from the banking sector (especially the 
local  savings  and  loans).  However,  since  the 
creation of the euro, the German banking system 
has diversified its holdings of government debt. 
Figure 1. (National) government debt held by domestic banks in France, Germany, Italy and the US (% of total) 
 
Source: Agence France Trésor, Bundesbank, Bank of Italy and FED. 
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note  analyses  four  elements  of  banking 
regulation that need to be addressed:  
1.  The risk weights (on sovereign debt) should 
not be kept at zero. The new risk weights do 
not  have  to  be  large,  but  they  should  be 
based  on  ‘objective’  criteria,  rather  than 
ratings.  
2.  Large banks (de facto all those under direct 
ECB  supervision)  should  not  be  allowed  to 
‘cherry  pick’  by  discarding  their  own  risk 
models for sovereign exposure (which allows 
them to benefit from the zero weight in the 
standard approach). 
3.  Liquidity  requirements  should  not  force 
banks to hold only government bonds; there 
are enough other liquid assets around. 
4.  Diversification  is  more  important  than  risk 
weighting  for  sovereign  exposure;  this 
problem can be addressed by applying ‘large 
exposure’ rules to sovereign debt. 
This  contribution  briefly  discusses  these  four 
issues in turn. 
1.  Recognising the riskiness of 
national sovereign debt in a 
monetary union 
The  case  of  Greece  has  shown  that  sovereign 
debt can no longer be regarded as riskless in the 
euro  area.  Banks  experienced  large  losses  from 
holding  Greek  sovereign  debt  that,  from  a 
regulatory  standpoint,  had  been  classified  as 
riskless.  These  banks  thus  were  not  obliged  to 
hold  any  capital  to  cover  these  losses.  It  is  of 
course to be hoped that the Greek ‘private sector 
involvement’ (PSI) remains a ‘unique and special 
case’, but this is by no means certain. Moreover, 
the ESM Treaty foresees explicitly the possibility 
of private-sector restructuring should in future a 
debt  sustainability  analysis  show  that  the 
country cannot service its debt in full. There is 
thus no reason to continue with the regulatory 
fiction that sovereign debt is always riskless. 
The  standard  objection  to  risk  weights  on 
sovereign  debt  is  that  they  contradict 
fundamental  principles  on  which  the  Basel 
capital  adequacy  regime  is  based.  It  is  indeed 
true that all Basel accords stipulated that banks 
do  not  necessarily  have  to  hold  any  capital 
against claims on their own government (and in 
their own currency) because government debt is 
regarded as riskless if it is the national currency.1 
The rationale for zero risk weights under normal 
conditions (i.e. the country has its own national 
currency) is clear: when the country has its own 
currency the government can, in extremis, always 
order the central bank to print enough money to 
be  able  to  service  its  debts.  This  might  create 
inflation, but the government should always be 
able to pay its debt on time (at least in nominal 
terms).  Under  the  ‘nominal’  principle  applied 
almost  everywhere,  such  debt  should  thus  be 
riskless. This is no longer valid in the euro area, 
however, where the debtor government has no 
authority over the creation of money. The ECB is 
actually  forbidden  to  provide  monetary 
financing  to  any  government  or  even  the  EU 
authorities.  When  monetary  and  fiscal 
authorities  are  separate  entities  as  in  the  euro 
area, default risk on sovereign debt is not zero. 
This was the intellectual mistake made when the 
Basel rules were transcribed into EU law (i.e. the 
Capital Requirements Directive).2 For any bank 
in the euro area, the CRD specifies that the risk 
weight of any sovereign exposure denominated 
in euro is zero. This should be changed. 
                                                   
1  Prominent  representatives  of  the  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  have  emphasised  that  the 
zero rating of sovereign exposure within the euro area 
also contradicts the spirit of the Basel accords, which 
are based on the principle that capital requirements 
should be related to the effective underlying risk of an 
exposure,  rather  than  formal  criteria  (see  Hannoun, 
2011). 
2 Annex VI of the CRD reads: 
1.2.  Exposures  in  the  national  currency  of  the 
borrower 
4.  Exposures  to  Member  States’  central 
governments and central banks denominated and 
funded  in  the  domestic  currency  of  that  central 
government and central bank shall be assigned a 
risk weight of 0%. 
This was the case even before EMU. The legal fiction 
employed when the euro was introduced was simply 
to  argue  that  from  a  legal  point  of  view  the  euro 
became  the  domestic  currency  of  all  participating 
member  states  in  EMU.  The  economic  reality  was 
(and remains) of course the opposite in the sense that 
the  euro  is  not  under  the  control  of  any  individual 
member  state  –  but  the  legal  fiction  was  attractive 
because  it  provided  member  states  with  cheaper 
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But on what basis should one determine any risk 
weights  on sovereign  debt  in  the  euro  area? It 
does  not make  sense  to  treat governments  like 
corporate institutions because governments, after 
all,  retain  the  power  to  tax.  From  a  financing 
point  of  view,  governments  are  actually  in  a 
similar  situation  as  banks  because  they  have 
liabilities (public debt) whose maturity is usually 
much  shorter  than  their  assets,  which  consist 
essentially  of  the  present  value  of  future  tax 
revenues.  
Under the normal Basel rules, most risk weights 
are  based  on  the  ratings  of  the  three  globally 
recognised ratings agencies (Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch Ratings). However, the euro 
crisis has shown that these ratings often follow 
events rather than serve as a leading indicator of 
problems.  Moreover,  certain  ratings  categories 
(e.g. junk) lead to cliff effects as many investors 
have  similar  minimum  ratings  requirements. 
This is why a reliance on ratings risks creating a 
self-reinforcing effect. For example, once the debt 
of  a  government  has  been  rated  ‘junk’,  few 
investors can still hold that debt, which in turn 
will make market access close to impossible and 
could thus provoke a crisis by itself. 
It would therefore be better to make risk weights 
on  government  debt  a  function  of  objective 
factors  (debt/deficit),  rather  than  ratings.  For 
example, the risk weight could remain at zero if 
both debt and the deficit as a percentage of GDP 
remain below 60% and 3%; but the risk weight 
would  be  increased  if  either  the  deficit  or  the 
debt  ratio  exceeds  the  ‘reference’  values  of  the 
Stability  Pact  (or  the  Fiscal  Compact).  For 
example, the risk weight could be increased by 
30 percentage points for each point of GDP of an 
excessive  deficit  that  persists  for  a  number  of 
years. Or the risk weight could be set equal to 
the amount the debt/GDP ratio of the country 
concerned is above the 60% threshold level.  
One has to keep in mind that even a risk weight 
of 100% means only that the bank has to hold the 
‘full’ 8% of capital against this risk. The formula 
proposed  here  would  thus  imply  that  the  risk 
weight of a country whose deficit is 1% of GDP 
above  the  permitted  level  (say  of  the  Fiscal 
Compact) would increase from zero to 30%. But 
this  would  mean  ‘only’  that  the  banks  would 
have  to  hold  more  capital  equal  to  0.3*8%  or 
equivalent  to  2.4%  of  their  exposure  to  this 
country. Even with a cost of capital for banks of 
25%,  this  would  imply  an  increase  in  funding 
costs  of  60  basis  points.  This  approach  would 
thus  lead  to  higher  borrowing  costs  and 
represent  a  real  deterrent.  But  it  should  not 
provoke a crisis because the data on deficits (and 
even more debt) changes only slowly over time. 
This  implies  that  relating  risk  weights to  these 
objective  factors  should  be  much  less 
destabilising than linking them to ratings (as is 
done  in  the  haircut  rules  of  the  ECB)  which 
sometimes jump by several notches within very 
short periods of time. 
In addition, the risk weights should be linked to 
the  stages  of  the  excessive  deficit  procedure 
(EDP),  e.g.  when  the  procedure  is  initially 
launched, the risk weight would be increased by 
a certain amount (say, 20 percentage points). For 
each  additional  stage  the  EDP  is  ratcheted  up, 
the  risk-weighting  would  be  increased  further. 
This  would  equip  the  EDP  with  real  teeth  to 
induce  reforms  even  without  resorting  to  the 
imposition  of  fines.  The  ECB  could  of  course 
adopt a similar tactic for the haircuts it imposes 
on sovereign debt in its collateral framework. 
Introducing  positive  risk  weights  for 
government debt will not be enough to prevent a 
crisis  because  of  the  ‘lumpiness’  of  sovereign 
risk.  Experience  has  shown  that  sovereign 
defaults  are  rare  events,  but  the  losses  are 
typically  very  large  (above  50%)  when  default 
does  materialise. In many  peripheral  countries, 
banks hold  sovereign  debt  equal  to  (or greater 
than) their total capital. Even with a risk weight 
of 100%, these banks would only have sufficient 
capital  reserves  to  cover  losses  of  8%.  Risk 
weights  would  thus  have  to  become  extremely 
high  before  they  could  protect  banks  against 
realistic  LGD  (loss  given  default)  scenarios  in 
case another ‘PSI’ materialises. This suggests that 
the  more  important  aspect  is  diversification, 
which will be discussed below. 
2.  Obscure but very important: 
‘Permanent Partial Exemption’ 
This term refers to one of the many wrinkles in 
the  way  the  EU  has  implemented  the  Basel 
agreements  on  banking  regulation  in  its  own 
Capital  Requirements  Directive  (CRD).  This 
exemption  is  contained  in  Art.  145  of  the 
Regulation  accompanying  the  CRD  on  the BANKING UNION WITH A SOVEREIGN VIRUS | 5 
 
“Conditions for permanent partial use” and says 
that banks that use the internal risk models (so-
called  IRB  banks)  to  calculate  the  riskiness  of 
their  assets  may  not  use  their  internal  risk 
models for sovereign exposure.3 
This seemingly secondary exemption is in reality 
crucial.4 Most large banks use their internal risk 
models to calculate the riskiness of their lending 
to  households,  the  corporate  sector  and  their 
other  assets.  By  doing  so  they  can  generally 
arrive  at  a  lower  level  of  capital  requirement 
than under the so-called standardised approach 
in which all lending falls in certain risk classes 
determined  by  rating  levels.  However,  these 
internal  risk  models  must  use  objective 
indicators to assess risk, for example past levels 
of losses or market prices like the cost of insuring 
                                                   
3 Article 145 
Conditions for permanent partial use  
1.  Where  institutions  have  received  the  prior 
permission  of  the  competent  authorities, 
institutions permitted to use the IRB Approach in 
the  calculation  of  risk-weighted  exposure 
amounts  and  expected  loss  amounts  for  one  or 
more  exposure  classes,  they  may  apply  the 
Standardised  Approach  for  the  following 
exposures: 
(a)…. 
(d) exposures to central governments of the Member 
States  and  their  regional  governments,  local 
authorities  and  administrative  bodies  provided:  (i) 
there is no difference in risk between the exposures to 
that  central  government  and  those  other  exposures 
because  of  specific  public  arrangements,  and  (ii) 
exposures to the central government are assigned a 0 
% risk weight under Article 109(4)” 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLIT
_COM:2011:0452%2801%29:FIN:EN:PDF 
4 In the words of Hannoun (2011), “the main criticism 
which  can  be  leveled  at  the  European  directives  is 
that, instead of confining the zero risk weight to the 
standardised  approach,  they  permit  a  generalised 
zero  risk  weight  through  the  so-called  ‘IRB 
permanent partial use’ rules. According to these rules, 
a  bank  can  apply  the  IRB  approach  to  corporate, 
mortgage or retail exposures, while applying a one-
size-fits all zero risk weight to the sovereign debt of 
EU member states. This is equivalent to a mutual and 
unqualified exemption of certain sovereign risks from 
capital charges; an exemption inconsistent with Basel 
II’s risk-sensitive framework.” 
against  the  default  of  a  counterparty  as 
expressed in the price of a so-called CDS (credit 
default  swap)  contract.  The  problem  is  that  in 
many cases no objective indicator of the riskiness 
of  government  bonds  would  indicate  a  strictly 
zero  risk.  This  implies  that  banks  that  use  the 
IRB  model  would  thus  have  to  hold  capital 
against  their  sovereign  exposure  (at  least  for 
those  sovereigns  for  which  the  CDS  prices  are 
not  very  close  to  zero).  But  this  EU  regulation 
allows banks to ‘cherry pick’ how they measure 
their risk: for sovereign exposure, banks can use 
the standardised approach, which, as explained 
above, assigns a risk of zero to all government 
bonds  of  euro  area  countries  if  they  are 
denominated in euro. 
It is clear that this so-called ‘permanent partial 
exemption’  represents  an  anomaly.  It  is 
especially  likely  to  be  allowed  in  the  countries 
under financial pressure where the government 
relies on the local banking system.5 The question 
is who will decide in future on whether banks 
can  continue  to  rely  on  this  loophole.  The 
Regulation  (see  footnote  3)  says  that  the 
‘competent authorities’ have to permit the use of 
this exemption. But unfortunately it is not clear 
whether this term refers to the regulators or the 
supervisors. If competent authorities here were 
to  refer  to  the  regulators,  nothing  much  will 
change even with the establishment of the SSM 
since  the  regulators  will  remain  national. 
However, if competent authorities here were to 
refer to the supervisors, the establishment of the 
SSM might bring about important changes since 
the  ECB  would  then  become  the  ‘competent 
authority’ for most large banks, most of which 
use the IRB approach. This means that it would 
be  up  to  the  ECB  to  stop  the  use  of  this 
permanent  partial  exemption,  which  in  turn 
would encourage banks to diminish their overall 
sovereign exposure. For example, the possibility 
for  IRB  banks  to  permanently  use  the 
standardised approach for certain exposures was 
never meant to be used for internationally active 
banks and supervisors were (and will continue 
                                                   
5 “The 2011 European stress test report that only 36 
out of the 90 participating banks applied their own 
internal model to sovereign risk, a lower fraction than 
for  the  corporate,  mortgage  or  retail  asset  classes” 
Hannoun (2011). 6 | DANIEL GROS 
 
to  be)  expected  not  to  approve  it  for  those 
banks.6 
3.  Liquidity requirements 
Another reason why banks hold large amounts 
of  government  debt  on  their  balance  sheets  is 
that  they  have  to  hold  a  certain  amount  of 
‘liquid’  assets.  Until  recently,  only  government 
bonds  were  recognised  as  liquid.7  However, 
experience  over  the  last  few  years  has  shown 
that  at  times  even  government  bonds  can 
become  illiquid.  Forcing  banks  to  hold  large 
amounts  of  government  bonds  might  thus  be 
counterproductive in the case of macroeconomic 
crises because the banks might then experience 
liquidity problems exactly at the time when their 
own  sovereign  is  in  difficulties  as  well.  This 
concern  seems  to  have  been  at  least  partially 
addressed  because  the  latest  version  of  the  so-
called liquidity cover ratio (LCR) allows banks to 
hold also other assets to satisfy the requirement 
of  the  LCR  that  they  should  be  able  to  offset 
potential  outflows  of  funds  by  selling  liquid 
assets. 
Liquidity  should  be  measured  by  market 
turnover,  bid-ask spreads  and similar  objective 
variables,  rather  than  formal  criteria.  The  past 
few  years  have  shown  that  in  times  of  acute 
stress, government bonds of some countries have 
become  illiquid,  whereas  there  was  never  any 
problem with stock markets. 
4.  The key: Exposure limits 
The  reason  why  a  fall  in  the  price  of  the 
sovereign bonds of a country so strongly affects 
also  the  banks  of  that  country  is  that  the 
government  bond  holdings  are  often  so 
                                                   
6 A response of the European Commission to criticism 
of the permanent partial exemption is interesting: “… 
the possibility for IRB banks to permanently use the 
standardised  approach  for  certain  exposures  was 
never  meant  to  be  used  for  internationally  active 
banks and supervisors were (and will continue to be) 
expected not to approve it for those banks.” See Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2012). 
7  For  a  summary  description  of  the  LCR,  see: 
http://www.bis.org/press/p130106a.pdf 
“Level  1  assets  generally  include cash,  central  bank 
reserves, and certain marketable securities backed by 
sovereigns …..” 
concentrated  on  the  home  sovereign.  This 
concentration is contrary to the general principle 
of risk diversification.8 The need to diversify risk 
is the reason why all regulated investors (banks, 
insurance companies, investment funds, pension 
funds) have to limit their exposure to any single 
counterparty  to  a  fraction  of  their  total 
investment or capital (for banks). For banks, the 
limit on the exposure to any one borrower is 25% 
of their capital, but this limit does not apply to 
sovereign debt. The logic of this exemption was 
simple: since there was thought to be no risk in 
sovereign debt, there was no reason to put any 
limits on concentration.9 The result of this lack of 
exposure  limits  has  been  that  banks  in  the 
periphery  have  too  much  debt  of  their  own 
government  on  their  balance  sheets  which  has 
greatly contributed to the deadly feedback loop 
between sovereigns and banks.  
Table  1  below  shows  the  degree  of  ‘domestic 
leverage’ of the systemically important banks in 
major euro area countries which were subject to 
the EBA stress tests. It is apparent that in most 
countries  the  domestic  banking  system  would 
not  survive  a  Greek-style  ‘hair  cut’  on  public 
debt. In the context of the PSI operation of March 
2012,  holders  of  Greek  bonds  had  to  accept  a 
nominal haircut of over 50%, and on a mark-to-
market  basis  the  haircut  was  over  80%.  It  is 
apparent  that  no  bank  that  has  a  sovereign 
exposure worth over 100% of its capital would 
survive  such  a  loss.  Unfortunately  this  type  of 
data  is  not  available  for  the  entire  banking 
system,  but  since  smaller  banks  will  have  a 
                                                   
8 A related risk that remains difficult to assess is that 
of correlation across groups of countries. During the 
euro crisis the risk premia on the peripheral countries 
were  highly  correlated;  but  the  yields  (and  thus 
prices) of the group of peripheral countries were at 
times  negatively  correlated  with  those  of  the  core 
(especially Germany). 
9 This is the logic followed in Article 113 of the 
Capital Adequacy Directive:  
3.  The  following  exposures  shall  be  exempted 
from the application of Article 111(1): 
(a)  asset  items  constituting  claims  on  central 
governments or central banks which, unsecured, 
would  be  assigned  a  0  %  risk  weight  under 
Articles 78 to 83;  
Note: Article 111 contains the concentration limit of 
25% of capital. BANKING UNION WITH A SOVEREIGN VIRUS | 7 
 
larger domestic bias, one must assume that the 
overall  exposure  of  the  Spanish  and  Italian 
banking systems to their sovereign is higher than 
the level reported in Table 1, which refers only to 
the sample of large banks subject to EBA stress 
tests.10 
Table 1. Domestic sovereign debt leverage 
 (sovereign exposure/capital) 
   2010Q4  2011Q4  2012Q2 
DE  264%  241%  235% 
ES  172%  131%  137% 
FR  73%  53%  61% 
IT  205%  155%  176% 
PL  156%  141%  115% 
PT  117%  102%  100% 
UK  50%  52%  50% 
Source: CEPS database. 
In  order  to  stabilise  the  euro  area's  financial 
system  and  make  it  'resilient'  to  sovereign 
insolvency,  banks  thus  need  to  be  induced  to 
diversify  their  holdings  of  government  debt. 
(And in general one should foster direct sales of 
public debt to households, instead of leveraged 
intermediaries like banks.) 
Introducing exposure limits now (during a crisis 
period)  would  of  course  be  pro-cyclical,  as  it 
would  force  Italian  and  Spanish  banks  to  sell 
large  amounts  of  (mostly  short-term) 
government  debt.  But  this  can  be  avoided  by 
grandfathering the existing stocks. The new rules 
on exposure limits could be applied only in the 
future and only to new investments. In this way, 
there would be no pressure on the banks in the 
periphery to sell any of their holdings. 
The concrete proposal, which would be easy to 
implement,  would  be  to  simply  eliminate  the 
                                                   
10  It  is  surprisingly  difficult  to  find reliable data  on 
sovereign exposure. This is partially due to the fact 
that in some countries banks lend directly to regional 
and local governments (e.g. Germany), but also due to 
the many ‘risk-mitigation’ measures banks can take. 
For  example,  many  banks  have  bought  CDS 
protection  to  lower  their  risk.  One  must  thus  be 
careful  in  interpreting  data  on  bank  holdings  of 
government  bonds.  The  EBA  stress  test  data  does 
reflect risk mitigation measures and thus give a better 
picture of the residual risk on banks’ balance sheets. 
exemption  for sovereign  debt  under  the  ‘Large 
Exposure  Directive’.  Banks  would  then  be 
prohibited from holding more than 25% of their 
capital  in  government  bonds  of  any  single 
sovereign.  But  this  new  rule  would  be  applied 
only to flows during a transition period. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
A large proportion of government debt is held 
by banks. This is not an ideal situation given that 
banks  are  highly  leveraged  and  that  sovereign 
debt is inherently subject to default risk within 
the  euro  area. For  financial  stability  reasons,  it 
would thus be preferable if a higher a proportion 
of  government  debt  were  held  by  unleveraged 
investors,  e.g.  directly  by  households  or  via 
investment  funds.  Within  the  euro  area,  banks 
have actually about as much government bonds 
on  their  books  as  they  have  emitted  bonds 
themselves. It is difficult to see why the public 
should  invest  in  bank  bonds  (whose  proceeds 
banks then invest in government bonds) rather 
than  directly  in  government  bonds.  The 
transactions  costs  for  households  buying 
government  bonds  directly  could  certainly  be 
further  reduced  given  that  most  government 
debt exists anyway only in electronic form in any 
event. 
In  reality,  however,  it  is  unlikely  that  the 
financing  patterns  for  government  debt  will 
change any time soon. But something could still 
be done to limit the dangers to financial stability 
in  an  environment  in  which  highly  leveraged 
banks  continue  to  hold  large  amounts  of 
government  debt.  The  key  problem  is  the 
excessive  home  bias,  which  leads  to  a 
concentration of risk. This needs to be changed. 
Banks  should  be  forced  to  diversify  their 
investment  in  government  debt  by  a  simple 
application  of  the  large  exposure  rules  which 
apply to all other bank business. 
The case of Cyprus, whose banks attracted large 
foreign deposits to invest abroad illustrates the 
consequences  of  excessive  risk  concentration. 
The two major banks in Cyprus, which had to be 
closed  or  restructured  recently,  had  invested 
more  than  their  total  capital  in  Greek 
government bonds. They thus effectively became 
insolvent when the PSI operation cut the value of 
these bonds to less than half their nominal value. 
Moreover,  given  the  massive  size  of  its  banks 8 | DANIEL GROS 
 
relative  to  the  economy  of  Cyprus,  these 
investments  in  Greek  government  paper 
amounted to a sizeable proportion of the GDP of 
the  country.  The  Greek  default  thus  put  the 
solvency of the entire country in jeopardy. Had 
the  large  exposure  rules  been  applied  to 
government debt, the problem in Cyprus would 
have been manageable. 
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